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The military junta, which toppled the monarchy and
put in place a shaky government that gained a
semblance of stability after a lot of bloodshed, was
only months old when a group of irate young students
quit college to start a war that would take 17
years. The name they chose for their movement told
their mission – liberating Tigray from whatever it
was the founders had in mind.
Through the years, the Tigray People’s Liberation
Front’s (TPLF’s) wise leaders probably relented on
their youthful decision to focus on Tigray alone and
lifted up the issue of ethnic subjugation and,
partly at the expense of the “neftegnas,” formed
ethnic organisations whose names still sound far
from party names: all of them movements, fronts and
organisations. Many had the opportunity to introduce
their local mother tongues as working languages in
regional state offices and education.
A very true, undeniable fact: many people in various
ethnic groups who had been made to feel ashamed of
their ethnic identities and those who felt
embarrassed because of their limitations in speaking
Amharic were at last able to seek and find pride in
their own shared identities based on linguistically
formed cultures. Maybe an historian should tell the
story of how Emperor Menelik’s expansion southwards
and the Oromo movement northwards (a.k.a. the Oromo
migration) ended up having different social impacts.
With or without the Revolutionary Democrats, there
would have been a lot of mess in post-Derg Ethiopia,
for surely many “nations, nationalities, and
peoples” – to use the EPRDF’s jargon – would have
raised a lot of hell to emerge from the darkness
they had lived in for so long. The EPRDF’s strategy
of governance might have been a double edged sword.
It gave these groups the recognition and freedom
they had always sought, and, because each group had
to suspiciously watch the other, that gave the
incumbent badly needed respite that enabled it to
strengthen its hold on power.
The EPRDF’s fear and uncertainty over how things
would turn out was demonstrated by it giving major
ministerial positions to people who were not part of
it. Beyene Petros (Prof) briefly held a government
position during the transition period in the early
1990s, so did many from the archrival Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF).
Now, even after nearly 19 years, the EPRDF still
insists on reminding people about the Derg era and
the times before that?
It is always focused on reminding people that it was
the EPRDF (and the people themselves) that ended the
days of ethnic subjugation. There was an emphasis on
that during the federalism debate. It also kept
saying this over and over again in its campaign
message broadcast on radio on March 3, 2010.
Take the history of the Derg from under the feet of
the EPRDF, and what would it say in its debates and
in its various campaign messages and developmental
journalism reports? Or take the issue of ethnic
federalism back to the time when it was decided that
the EPRDF had to be created and TPLF no longer
wanted the “LF” part of its name and question the
rationale?
Take the issue back further by debating how tension,
fear, mutual distrust, as well as the availability
of long sought-after freedoms and opportunities can
encourage the people living in such a state to rely
on some other superior force, such as the EPRDF.
The best way of debating the type of federalism that
the EPRDF has established in Ethiopia should not be
related to the way the Derg ran the country. It
would be preferable to discuss the many other
possible forms of political organisation for the
post-Derg Ethiopia and debate the merits of each
form. That way, they would probably come up with a
structure that would please more than it would
displease.
Debaters from the Revolutionary Democratic camp,
Tefera Deribew and Junedin Sado, keep emphasising
that the opposition to ethnic (or language) based
federalism was a longing for the old system and a
mistrust of the people that were given their
freedoms.
“Why do you doubt Oromia?” asked Junedin.
That was an attempt to appeal to the sentiments of
various ethnic groups. It was directed to make them
develop a mortal fear of what the opposition parties
could possibly do if they came to power. Two of the
lowest points in the EPRDF debate were the
references made to Eritrea and Somalia. Junedin
believes that the Eritrean question was resolved
when the EPLF took power by force on May 24, 1991.
He does not seem to realise that Ethio-Eritrean
problems lingered on because the end of the war and
the fall of the Derg was not the solution to the
longstanding problem.
As if the debaters were both out to make fools of
their own parties, Tefera also shared a piece of his
knowledge on crisis and conflict. Somalia is
languishing in its state of misery because it does
not have a federal structure that recognises the
rights of the people to secede.
I see now Somalis have a reason to relax. With the
problem identified, they are close to a state of
peace and reconstruction. But I also see one little
problem here. There are not as many languages to
allow a federal structure as in Ethiopia, if we were
to go by the logic that Ethiopia’s federalism
structure is based on.
What Somalia has is clans, sub-clans and
sub-sub-clans. Members of these groups trace their
roots to their specific clans whether they live in
Baidoa, Mogadishu, or the Ogaden – or even Europe
and the United States, for that matter. Maybe
Somalia can use a federal structure that does not
have geographic restrictions, one that does not
trace boundaries, but one that is drawn on
bloodlines (relationships).
On the other hand, while Lidetu Ayalew, leader of
the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), strongly
opposed the constitution that favoured group rights
over individual rights (the ownership of the country
has been given to groups instead of to each
individual citizen), he failed to elaborate why that
mattered.
What difference would it make to Behafta, Abebe and
Gemechu? Would they be able to sell their piece of
the country and leave to settle in another country?
Failing to do that, he, and others who sported the
same idea, have failed to provide reassurance to
people who are enjoying the “nations and
nationalities” bonanza that was given to them by the
incumbent. And the opposition parties will not take
this away.
It seems the opposition scored more points on the
federalism debate but only slightly so. Each of them
surely had only one-third of the time that was given
to the EPRDF, but time did not seem to have been a
constraint, as ideas were being repeated.
It would be good, though, if the parties were brave
enough to go deeper on many issues and if the
debates were more deliberative, allowing
interruptions for the purpose of arguing against
specific points. |
